The data and calculations below show that (a) the lower values of time coupled with (b) the lower total HS2 trips, in the 2013 study should greatly reduce user benefits. Instead the new study pretends to an increase of 24%, which is astonishing, if not entirely unbelievable.
Likewise the effect of the increased construction costs seems should have depressed the benefit to cost ratios. Not withstanding the expectation these ratios are immaterially different form those in the January 2012 analysis, see table below.
Here is the detail where the data refers to the full network out to Leeds and Manchester.
(1) Trips using HS2.
In 2012 we had 380,000 [1] per 16 hour week day: In 2013 that had fallen to 301,140, [2] a 21% reduction. A reasonable presumption is that this reduction would reduce the user benefits by 20%.
(2) Values of time.
From Table 3 of the October 2013 report we have::
Travel Purpose
|
Old Values of Time
|
New Values of Time
|
% change
|
Business
|
£47.18
|
£31.96
|
-32.26
|
Commuting
|
£6.46
|
£6.81
|
+5.41
|
Leisure
|
£5.71
|
£6.04
|
+5.78
|
Nevertheless it is clear that the very substantial reduction in business time should have reduced the corresponding benefits. Instead these benefits are increased by one third or by circa £10bn, for heavens sake.
(3) Generated or New Trips.
In 2012 24% of trips were new[3] providing 91,200 (e.g. 380,000 from (1) above x 0.24 = 91,200). The 2013 report cites 26% [4]providing 78,296 (e.g. 301,140 x 0.26 = 78,296). The latter is close to the 76,886 obtained from HS2 Ltd [5].
This reduction in generated trips is strange. Has HS2’s consultant reduced these and increased the pre-existing trips? If so the move would increase the calculated benefits since new trips are generally assigned half the values of time of those attributed to existing trips.
(4) Costs.
The 2012 construction (or capital) cost was £33bn. The October 2013 study contains cost with a range of probabilities. The one most cited is the “P95” value of £42bn, meaning that there was a 95% probability that that value would not be exceeded. Adding for the trains provides the often cited £50bn. However that cost was not used in the “standard case” analysis which provides the Benefit to Cost Ratios most often cited. Instead the P50 value of 38bn was applied.
In any event the net cost of the scheme at the 2011 price and discount base was increased from the 2012 study range of 24.1bn to £26.3bn to a single figure of £31.1bn
(5) Cost benefit analysis.
The table below compares the 2012 data with that from the standard case 2013 data. From that table we see that:
What is going on? How has that been achieved? Nearly all the changes outlined above should have reduced the rations substantially.
Have they vastly increased the proportion trips which are for business or what?
£(billions): 2011 PV base
|
Purpose
|
Jan 2012
Table 9
|
Oct 2013
Table 15
|
|
Low
|
High
|
Standard
case
|
||
(1) Transport User Benefits
|
Business
|
28.80
|
32.30
|
40.50
|
|
Other
|
15.30
|
17.40
|
19.30
|
|
Total
|
44.10
|
49.70
|
59.80
|
(2) Other quantifiable benefits
|
|
1.00
|
1.10
|
0.80
|
(3) Loss to Government of Indirect Taxes
|
|
-3.60
|
-3.90
|
-2.90
|
(4) Net Transport Benefits (PVB) = (1) + (2) + (3)
|
|
41.40
|
46.90
|
57.70
|
(5) Wider Economic Impacts (WEIs)
|
|
5.70
|
12.30
|
13.30
|
(6) Net Benefits including WEIs = (4) + (5)
|
|
47.20
|
59.30
|
71.00
|
(7) Capital Costs
|
|
36.40
|
36.40
|
40.50
|
(8) Operating Costs
|
|
21.70
|
21.70
|
22.10
|
(9) Total Costs = (7) + (8)
|
|
58.10
|
58.10
|
62.60
|
(10) Revenues
|
|
31.80
|
34.00
|
31.10
|
(11) Net Costs to Government (PVC) = (9) – (10)
|
|
26.30
|
24.10
|
31.50
|
(12) BCR without WEIs (ratio) = (4)/(11)
|
|
1.60
|
1.90
|
1.80
|
(13) BCR with WEIs (ratio) = (6)/(11)
|
|
1.80
|
2.50
|
2.30
|